INTRODUCTION
In 1958 three years after the politicization of the Bakongo ethnic party ABAKO just few months prior to the catalytic January 1959 Leopoldville riots and short two years before national independ ence an urban-based group of teachers traders workers and lowerechelon civil servants1 all originating from the rural territoire of Luozi north of the Congo river known as the Manianga formed an association called the Manianga Superior Council.2 According to
The research for this article was made possible through grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program as part of more extensive fieldwork conducted in the Lower Congo Congo-Kinshasa from November 1964 through March 1966 An abridged version was read at the loth Annual African Studies Association Meeting in New York November 1-4 1967 Although by 1958 the Belgian colonial government had begun to appoint Africans to the lower echelons of the upper grade administrative level hitherto reserved for Europeans the majority of the civil servants involved in the Manianga Council were still of the lower grade or the auxiliary staff not having completed their secondary studies cf Georges BRAUSCH Belgian Administration in the Congo London 1961 pp [29] [30] The Conseil Supérieur des Manianga CSM is the most important in sequence of titles used to identify various associations movements and proposals among Manianga elite including more specifically the Coopérative des Produits Agricoles du Manianga COPAM) the Société Coopérative des Manianga SOCOMAN) thé Conseil Supérieur des Manianga-rénové CSM-rénové) thé Forces Vives des Manianga the Union des Intellectuels des Manianga UDIMA) the Conseil Supérieur des Manianga-révolutionnaires CSM-rév.) and finally again the Conseil Supérieur des Manianga CONSUMA) not to be mistaken with the CSM above For the sake of clarity refer to the quasi-corporative tradition of Manianga interest groups evident here simply as the Manianga Council unless explicitly mentioning particular group schematic table showing the historic connections of these groups is shown in Chart 595 in the conclusion the first statutes of the Council it was to be an apolitical association1 modeled after the early ABAKO to promote economic social polit ical sic] and moral development of the Manianga people.2
As was the case with many other regional and/or ethnic associations that came into existence in the Congo at this time the Manianga Council served more as rallying emblem for the regional elite and an arena for political maneuvering in the immediate pre-independence scramble for legislative and administrative positions than as tightlyorganized corporate body with disciplined programme of development for the rural Manianga
In its earliest phase the Council operated most clearly as regional coordinating extension of the ABAKO ethnic party similar to it yet distinctly within it Nevertheless specifically Maniangan regionalist sentiment evident in the very formation of the Council became growing reality Personality conflicts in subsequent national-level politics and an increasingly autocratic provincial government in the Lower Congo brought to the surface latent forces created by the unique ecological economic and colonial experience of the Maniangans to produce an extension of residual cleavages3 and the solidification of primordial regional attachments.4 In time too characteristic pattern of political process emerged as the institutional form of this regionalist sentiment situational factionalism recruited variously along lines of social age gaps differential participation in government and the ruralurban interest dichotomy marked by sequence of internal coups reflecting the shift of power from one sector of the society to another Because regional level politics in Central and Equatorial Africa whether it is focused in council such as that under review here or not is often rather far from the center of power and therefore considered insignificant because it is frequently shrouded in colloquial rhetoric and therefore incomprehensible short of learning the language in which it is waged and because it is usually not well documented unless one goes to the main actors and their private files it has understandably not received as much attention by outside scholars as it deserves Particularly in fragile political contexts like that This term was used by the colony to identify ethnic associations although obviously it is misnomer in any analytical sense Later on in the rhetoric of Congolese politicians the apolitical takes on the meaning of reconciliation accord and brotherhood among dissenting factions It also becomes con venient terminological covering for patently political activity when politician and political parties are in bad repute with the national government Statuts du Conseil Supérieur des Manianga Leopoldville 1960 Cf Aristide ZOLBERG Thé Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa University of Chicago unpublished manuscript 1966 Cf Clifford GEERTZ The Integrative Revolution in GEERTZ ed. Old Societies and New States Glencoe 1960 pp 105-157 of the post-independence Republic of the Congo the micropolitics of region demonstrating its own kind of institutional continuity allocating authority expressing and resolving conflict within determinate section of the population can show us more authentic picture of deeply-ingrained political culture than the rarif ed air of national regime-level politics where institutions are affected at every turn of events by the recognizable style of few individuals in power at the moment.1 closer analysis of regional micropolitics in the Lower Congo Republic of the Congo-Kinshasa begins with the role played by the Manianga Council one of many similar groups in provincial and national events at the time of independence It will then be necessary to turn to the question of why the Manianga although not tradi tional tribe even in the Equatorial African acephalous sense became self-conscious region in contemporary times After brief appraisal of the structural characteristics in the several corporate groups that both express and continue to propagate such Manianga regionalism attention turns to the political process of three consecutive coups from 1960 to 1965 within the Manianga community or more precisely within the Manianga Council EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF MANIANGA REGIONALISM 
Manianga region
The only pre-colonial regionally-extensive social entity that would qualify as an antecedent to contemporary Manianga solidarity would be the traditional elitist Lemba order which in the late nineteenth-century acephalous society of disconnected hamlets patronized trading in the rotating market system and bound together otherwise prestigious offices of judge healer and lineage headman into coherent status system An examination of the ecological conditions of the area as backdrop to social and administrative structures provides the most plausible causal explanation for Manianga regionalism majority of the Manianga population inhabits the zone lying north of an imposing mountain range closely paralleling the Congo river on the plateau extending northward into Congo-Brazzaville When this area was arbitrarily defined as belonging to the southern network of institutions that successively became the Congo Free State the Belgian Congo and the Republic of the Congo-Kinshasa1 the natural ties to commercial and administrative centers in the north were se verely thwarted
Although the legal orientation of the Manianga remained in the south the actual orientation continued to focus the north Secession of the North Manianga although politically subversive nevertheless made good economic sense Even at the height of the 1965 tensions between the two Congo States illicit travel and trade continued back and forth as it always had
Because of this artificially-created geographical isolation the Manianga region received little early attention from the Belgian colonial government Roads were opened in the area only as late as 1935 to 1950 even though as early as 1915 railways had already been laid from 20 to 50 miles beyond its borders on three sides Until 1930 all exportation of agricultural produce and until the present in many areas was made by foot portage Paradoxically however positive effect of this artificial isolation was that the demoralizing recruitment of labor particularly for the railroads that virtually destroyed entire communities elsewhere did not adversely affect the Manianga At the same time lacking any agricultural commercial or industrial enterprises to speak of the voluntary emigration of laborers was continuously high from an early time on
The Manianga emigrant laborer however never left home very far behind there is evidence in the form of permanent village housing personal property and vehicles that good percentage of the earnings gained outside returned eventually to the village Another paradoxical characteristic of the Manianga region was that although drastically underdeveloped economically it could By the 1884-85 Berlin Conference boast of high degree of literacy among common villagers and by 1965 one of the highest ratios of students higher education of any similar area in the Congo To no small degree this was due to the long-time presence in the Manianga of the progressive Svenska Missionsförbundet and the competition of the Catholics to offset its influence Because of the relatively late introduction of systematic colonial governement and European commerce and the immunity of the region to forced labor emigration the Manianga presents the observer today with the anomalous picture of well-integrated progressivelyoriented traditional society
Significantly it was by and large spared that middle generation of men who received neither the traditional nor modern education number of independence politicians of the area including the Deputy Bivuvu mentioned above participated in initiations to the Lemba order and retained the outlook of the landed elite to which they belonged Although the Lemba order was to degree replaced in the twenties by the new pro phetic sects as an indication of regional integration there was never whole-hearted cooperation in the Manianga with the colonial regime It is hardly surprising then that the close geographical proximity to large urban centers juxtaposed with the dearth of market outlets for primary agricultural products served to exacerbate regional consciousness to the point of critical sensitivity as early as 1950
In order to understand Manianga regionalism at this point it is necessary to consider the role of European merchants and colonial agricultural policy When in the thirties Portuguese and Flemish merchants followed the newly-opened roads into the Manianga the colonial agricultural-economic policy designated the area as being suited for the cultivation of urena fibers These would furnish convenient cash crop marketable locally to European traders thereby allowing the Congolese to augment their income Although the colonial administration expressed recognition of the potential dangers of regional economy based on single cash crop it became the urena fibers often forceably cultivated which eventually developed the Manianga economic superstructure government-sponsored paysannat1 was opened in the fertile Luala valley to apply partial mechanization to fiber cultivation and cooperative the Cooperative des Produits de Luala COPAL organized among the resident This was one of several dozen similar collective farming enterprises launched by the Belgian colonial government Although the Luala paysannat was able to survive the economic crises of independence with massive aid from the European Common Market and diversification of its crops many other paysannats elsewhere in the Congo were abandoned because of social problems among residents and the overall uneconomical operation with mechanized methods paysans to assure them market This combination of factors with the Congolese providing the unskilled labor and the European merchants acting as middlemen and buyers may be said to have constituted the logical outcome of government policy on cash crops drastic decline in the international fiber prices from 1951-52 to something near two-thirds reduction from few years earlier revealed the weakness of this monocultural economy
In 1952 and 1953 many villagers opted for jail term in lieu of following the forceable requests to harvest the fibers anyway With the local economy thus cast into near chaotic condition it was however not until 1956 and then with 50 per cent increase in the head tax to finance local government that the labor-intensive corvee fiber policy was abandoned Overnight the Maniangans almost totally halted their cultivation of fibers Proof that the twenty-year experience with urena fibers as cash crop had not been totally in vain came in the first semblance of organized reaction to it
The years from 1953 to 1955 saw the creation of an indigenous marketing cooperative the Cooperative des Produits Agricoles du Manianga COPAM) by group of North Manianga merchants teachers and small-scale village farmers In contrast to the fiber-specialized colonially-supported paysannatcooperative COPAL the new COPAM was oriented toward the rural purchase of surpluses in food staples such as manioc peanuts and palm products and their resale on urban markets in near-by cities including Leopoldville Although European buyers for these agri cultural products especially palm products had been involved in Manianga commerce for some time already it was not until the prospect for cash advantage for Congolese merchants appeared that any real influx in voluntary cash crop cultivation occurred and with it the possibility that the full cycle of production and mar keting gravitate into the hands of Congolese Local response to COPAM was good and by the peak operating year 1958 more than ooo individuals had each contributed the minimal membership due of 500 francs Expansion and improvement of facilities were however handicapped from the start by lack of capital the kind required for the purchase of vehicles and processing machines and the like Although numerous applications for governmental loans were made in the rubric of Aid to indigenous such aid was never forthcoming It is clear today that between the various departments of the colonial administration conflicting policies were operative in this regard For although the COPAM received the technical assistance of Belgian auditor-accountant the local territoire administration did not see fit to qualify it for badly-needed loan One plausible explanation for such local colonial opposition to the cooperative is of course that in the eyes of an overworked admin istrator one cooperative in this case the COPAL sufficed to serve the needs of the rural area More correctly perhaps the colony at the local level opposed the creation of the COPAM because it threatened the security of the European merchants active in the area who as commercial middlemen actually controlled the key link in converting local labor to cash which in the form of head tax financed the local secteur government and encouraged the local sale of consumer goods
From an examination of the secteur records however it is apparent that the opposition on the part of the local colonial officials persisted most of all because the COPAM constituted an organized political body and therefore force to be reckoned with however explicit its economic function may have been.1
Although this particular cooperative eventually ended in financial chaos as will be shown below it alongside the Manianga Council as largely urban group merits closer structural analysis Through these two organizations was formed hierarchy and alliance of Manianga elite which would provide the matrix of subsequent postindependence political activity The cooperative was only derivatively political in function because of its concerted opposition to colonial agricultural and marketing policy its primary function organizationally was economic and administrative the successful transformation of rural crops into marketable produce
In its later stages as its organiza tional network became nearly synonymous with the rural ABAKO hierarchy the functional focus was shifted from the economic to the political largely to the detriment of the former By contrast the Manianga Council held more explicitly political function from the start its own statutes of apoliticality notwith standing Its collective goals were aimed not so much at devising and instrumenting specific economic or social programmes as to protect the regionally-linked representation of that collectivity in the new governement Although the interests and actions were restricted to regionally-defined considerations within that sphere its self-defined function was nearly unlimited This feature brings the Manianga Council very close to fitting notion of the particularistic party more concerned with interest articulation than with that latter potential being limited and prestructured by its identification with particular ethnic group.2 More concerned with articulation of interests than with actual aggre gation of institutions such groups formulate interests and demands and transmit them to other political structures such as political parties legislatures and bureaucracies in developing systems such as the Congo in 1960 Almond argues they may also be concern ed with presenting candidates in elections and with advocating policies.3
The principal functional tendency of each group or organization played an important role in determining further structural character istics for example that of recruitment to membership and significant Obviously not all Maniangans nor even all of the salaried educa tional occupational and self-styled elite were concerned with the support and affairs of the Manianga Council Participation through out the years with which this article is concerned was periodic and sporadic common affairs tended to be issue-and person-centered Contingent on this the authority or representativeness of the central committee to act on behalf of the Manianga regional population was itself sporadic and issue-oriented This sketchy legitimacy of offices constituting the central committee despite the overall legitimacy of the Council as symbol and idea made it neces sary for the central committee to consult an ad hoc real constituency from within the Manianga population at every juncture and issue It was difficult to find anything resembling an administrative hierarchy wdthin the Council
The central committee of president vice-president and secretary and supporting councillors was made up of those individuals usually who at given moment were politically most solvent so to speak who through local prestige or proximity to external foci of power in government or by virtue of personal ties to prominent individuals of any kind could offer political patronage to their co-regionalists In other words the central committee within the more amorphous Council constituted system of influence brokerage between govern ment and party on the one hand and the rural and urban Manianga populace on the other It goes without saying that in such fluid context the center of power and prestige could shift very quickly from one enclave faction social stratum or age group to another as will be seen shortly in the next section of this work Quite another situation is evident in the rural cooperative Support of the officials was provided by voluntary and discrete membership as the most effective mode of recruitment and participation to facilitate measure of faith in the administration and hands off attitude toward such routine bureaucratic responsibilities as buying and selling
The cooperative required consensus to get on with specific job other issues between kinsmen qua their kinship for example could usually be circumvented and dealt with by other social mechanisms Such consensual support in business operations occasionally required reaffirmation in the face of policy decisions and small-scale conflicts More serious conflicts however which taxed the consensual basis of the corporate form often paralyzed commercial operations It should be apparent then that the functional orientation of the organization may well determine its internal structure This fact has bearing on the manner in which the structure is made manifest through time
Functionally specific groups such as the Manianga cooperative COPAM but also the religious sects of the Manianga when faced with internal conflict beyond the limits of consensual resolution tend to mutate around new consensual charter or leader or seen from another angle they may spawn dissident hived off groups which again can proceed to order their particular affairs on the basis of consensus Groups such as the Manianga Council in contrast which are not strictly-speaking voluntary associations serve more purely political function in that they embody diffuse basis for the very cohesion of society in the regionalist sentiment and provide an arena for competition and conflict in the aspiration for support and government office);1 their interests are multiple and largely contingent on current events
Internal conflicts are here expressed in factional structure along the lines of the major cleavages in society such as those of the rural-urban distinction age groupings educational differences and occupational and governmental roles Over the course of time as power shifts occur the internal differen tiation of the broad Council populace will give rise to series of successive reversals of power or coups as factionally-formed cliques vie for control of central committeeship and the right to determine regionally-related interests
In the following description of three such coups occuring in the broader Manianga Council from 1960 until 1965 it will become apparent that there is much in common here with the hiving off pattern in sects and cooperatives and with segmentation of lineages As long as the rural cooperative of the North Manianga could retain support in reaction to colonial government policy and as long as it experienced no major breakdowns with its vehicles it continued to prosper financially When however its chief adminis trators became involved in the 1960 election campaigns to the distrac tion of commerce and its already untrustworthy vehicles faltered the members began to question the efficacy of this particular cooperative But if economics had momentarily come to standstill in 1960 the year of independence the cooperative leadership was more success ful politically Bivuvu1 the organizer and first president of the cooperative became secteur section ABAKO party president and later of course provincial deputy Kamuna his paternal kinsman and vice-president of the cooperative replaced Bivuvu then as ABAKO secteur president and inherited the management of the cooperative not altogether happy task since by mid-1960 it carried large deficit Analagously to the way in which the biblical figure tore down his old barns to build bigger Kamuna set out to lay the groundwork for Manianga-wide cooperative move which was spoken of as economic to rescue faltering but otherwise sound opera tion
The old cooperative members were given the option of either withdrawing their shares or of doing nothing and thereby automatical ly being transformed into the membership of the new organization which would carry the new name of The Cooperative Society of the Manianga SOCOMAN Opening solicitations brought in over 200 ooo francs and nearly ooo members from the countryside alone Although the renewed commerce of the new cooperative was slow in getting off the ground due to shortage of vehicles its bureaucracy was quite expansive and offices plentiful.2 Already mentioned above in connection with the division of the Manianga territory 575) The Changing Economic Structure of Buganda in FALLERS and RICHARDS eds The Men Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence London 1964 pp 58-59 suggests that in East Africa precisely such bureaucratic ballooning as this satiated the need for office-holding as form of prestige along with the economic functions it fulfilled in cooperatives In December 1960 Kamuna brought the evidence of his expanded organizing activities before an assembly of the Manianga Council in Leopoldville hoping to gain the financial and political support of the more experienced urbanités as he put it Their response proved to be ambivalent attachment to the mismanaged COPAM blotted his prospects now.1 There was some question over the place of administration of this new expanded cooperative Kamuna argued for its placement in the heart of their common region while certain Council members argued for the advantages of an urban administrative center
The real issue beneath this debate over the best location of an administrative center lay in the threat Kamuna with his extend ed rural and urban network of commitments and pledges and the urban Council activists who felt that their influence among Maniangans was being replaced For parallel events reflected an attempt on the part of the urban Council to extend its influence over the countryside An overall broadening of function within any kind of organiza tional activity was occurring politicization of the rural cooperative notion and an economic inclination on the part of the Manianga Council activists rural-based Manianga palm oil processing plant that had been in the hands of Portuguese colon was up for sale to the highest bidder for two million francs prohibitively high price for the Council Nevertheless seeing an opportunity here to invest in seemingly solid business and extend their influence over the countryside and to benefit their rural homeland the urban Maniangans led by the Council vice-president Baniengumuna2 successfully appealed to ABAKO and to other colleagues for funds collecting million francs from ABAKO and the remainder from other sources However loans from ABAKO at this time meant obeisance to party leaders so once again party rebel Kanza was disclaimed On the other hand the judicious investment of public funds meant internal influence Significantly strategic move outside had given the central committee of the Manianga Council bargaining power and influence In July 1961 the grand opening and first general assembly of the new cooperative SOCOMAN was scheduled to be held in Luozi the rural capital town of the Manianga No other location could better accomodate purely Maniangan venture such as this wrote citizens council comprising the discontented membership of the COPAM investigated the operations of the cooperative staff and in 1965 announced that more than 60 ooo francs of unpaid dividends should be returned to the members Cf 574
Kamuna inviting the rural communal secteur mayors and other prominent figures As it turned out Kamuna would need all the support he could muster along with his dossier of members collected dues and evidence of renewed commercial activity For when the assembly opened delegation from Leopoldville headed by Baniengumuna carrying the trump card of successful purchase of the palm oil processing plant had arrived to assert his claim to any purely Maniangan economic venture such as this cooperative network In the four-day meeting that followed virtual showdown developed between Kamuna the self-claimed organizer of the rural countryside and the urban Manianga Council leaders headed by Baniengumuna In the process the urbanités succeeded in ousting Kamuna from his anticipated position of general head of the new organization Rather it was Baniengumuna with his palm oil refinery who managed to carry the day and receive overwhelming support to become the new president of SOCOMAN to be identified with the palm processing plant while Kamuna now got only the lowly position of book-keeper This then was the coup of town political organization over the rural beginning of self-help just at that point where it threatened to become significant.1
Within the context of Manianga politics this coup of Baniengumuna the vice-president of the Manianga Council over Kamuna organizer of the cooperative with respect to the control of economic and commer cial activities in the Manianga amounted to an overall consolidation of authority in the hands of few men and the overlapping of offices in various corporate organizations By mid-ig the president of
The limited scope of this work precludes more than sketchy description of subsequent Manianga cooperative organizations in themselves excellent examples of structural hiving-off as mode of conflict resolution in functionally more specific groups Kamuna stunned by his political defeat turned around to revamp the old COPAM requesting that funds earlier appropriated to SOCOMAN now be returned to him new limited cooperative gathering together Kamuna and few close kinsmen and neighbors called the Société Coopérative des Gens de Bonne Volonté SOCOBONNE) would in essence be continuation of COPAM minus the dissenters and grumblers This however never got beyond rather utopian drawing boards Meanwhile Baniengumuna the new SOCOMAN general president experienced measure of success with the palm oil refinery and was even able to buy new 5-ton truck in 1965 with cooperative earnings But despite this large overhead expenses an overlyexpansive bureaucratic staff and other excesses made it impossible to return any dividends to the constituency Few general assemblies were held and by 1966 the membership was generally disgruntled By late 1965 Baniengu muna had begun to organize new group the Société Coopérative Industrielle de Luozi SOCODELI around nucleus of colleagues and an anomalous group of Swiss capitalists Formally to be subsection within the legal SOCOMAN the new industrial group would focus on mining interests in the Manianga Such independent planning in the view of many aroused widespread suspicion that Baniengumuna had or as the Kongo idiom puts it broken the in the interest of his own limited aspirations The charge of all three opposition movements against the estab lished Manianga Council central committee was that of patrimonialism or as the Kikongo neologism so often read in the press and heard in conversation put it mbutisme.s This allegation is drawn from the politics of lineage affairs and applies to situations where the youths feel that their elders have for too long rested on their laurels of seniority and age condition of paralyzing tension euphe mistically spoken of as their having sapped the vitality of the organization None of the three opposition movements within the Manianga Georges BALANDIER cited in YOUNG 197 Benoît VERHAEGEN and Maurice LOVENS La fonction politique des villes au Congo Cahiers conomiques et Sociaux II 1964 277 By classe bourgeoise en formation these authors mean particularly government functionaries but also the employees of various nrms and the privatelyemployed entrepreneurs and merchants From mbuta the complement of which is nieeke status inferior or junior
The relationship between the two in other contexts is subject to extravagant ritual lacing because such matters as inheritance and succession to office are involved and colored by the inuendos of witchcraft Council achieved its aim of renewing the formal central committee at least not at first Their vocal opposition was met with the mute sullenness of the incumbents who put them off with the charge of being power thirsty Warning the rural mayors to arrest on sight any of the urban agitators the Manianga Council president could defend his position in early-1964 with the following words The ABAKO and its right arm the Manianga Superior Council are in existence for the general interest of all the Manianga Thus it is useless to introduce other movements simply to sow disorder and misunderstanding in the Manianga to satisfy their course au pouvoir.
It was not until the three opposition groups merged under the title of the Renewed Manianga Superior Council CSM-rénové) no longer merely to oppose but to usurp the function of the central committee that their bargaining power can be said to have increased appreciably Significantly their position was acknowledged to be contra-ABAKO particularly contra-Moanda the governor although they still consider ed themselves solidly within and citizens of the Kongo Central Province
The flourish of activity in Manianga politics that led to this stalemate between the old guard central committee of the Manianga Council and the rebel Renewed Manianga Council may be considered in part prelude to the legislative elections originally planned for late 1964 but eventually held in 1965 following Moïse return to the Congo Thus already before the date of the election had been set there were petitions by various ad hoc Manianga com mittees demanding strictly Manianga electoral list to be drawn up by the Manianga people and not by political committee in an unrepresentative party
The most active rural committee of this sort stood in loose contact with the Renewed Manianga Council the old guard Council committee for all its talk did very little campaigning
With the official opening of the campaign by the then Prime Minister Tshombe the incumbent central committee of the Manianga Council together with the provincial and national legislators of Manianga origin who collectively called themselves les élus the joined voices and called for the immediate dissolution of all splinter Manianga groups by force if necessary in accord with Congolese and international law! With the legislative stakes high and vested interests strong all the various factions among Maniangans were brought together by this rhetoric in what was perhaps one of the most heated general assemblies ever held in the history of the Council Against the threat of not being represented at all in the next legislative period Manianga regionalist sentiment was strong enough to compel to momentary unity all the dissident groups the old central committee the the renewed council the revolu tionary council and all the non-aligned individuals What had seemed to constitute intractable and conflicting factions and cliques within factions dissolved during this meeting into consensual accord which granted the clique at the head of the former Intellectual Union UDIMA the mandate to lead newly consolidat ed central committee now labelled CONSUMA to avoid any confusion with the old abbreviation CSM That this transfer of office should constitute significant coup any more legitimate than the earlier usurped offices by the renewed council is verified by the actions following this meeting of the incumbent central committee members Baniengumuna acting as spokesman of the pro-ABAKO faction and the incumbent Council officers capitulated in writing few days later with these formal phrases Upon examining my conscience put aside all secretive aspirations and jealousies Everything has its beginning and its end true Manianga is not traitor who betrays his patrie But since the Manianga Council of notables and sages has éclaté even though it was movement of peace and trump card sic for ABAKO and not particularistic propaganda instrument for anyone we have become the object of criticism and insidious comments from friends here and there Consequently in order not to disappoint or sadden the Maniangans of good will ask you the new president general to call together the heads of the dissolved associations in order to proceed with public remission and reassignment of duties before the former president of the Council thus to accord your committee priority.
If the developments of this second coup are analyzed the out standing characteristic is that the regional Manianga ethos appears to have become if anything more compelling than it was in the earlier 1960 elections While the 1960 elections were held with the idea that the Manianga Council was within ABAKO now the campaign was being defined as over against ABAKO The points of greatest unanimity corresponded to the points of greatest perceived threat in this case that of not being adequately represented in the second legislature
The Third Coup The Politics of Bureaucratic Loopholes With clear mandate from most Manianga interest groups the new central committee could plan its election strategy
To avert the defection of rural leaders to the regional ABAKO campaign being waged by few diehards it was resolved to grant priority in choosing provincial assembly-men to those secteurs now called com munes that had not gotten their man into office in the first legisia-ture 1960-1965) to gain maximum support from the big men associated with the Manianga to invite Kanza who meanwhile had been head-mayor of Leopoldville to explain his intentions before the Council cell of Kanza supporters had already joined the new committee contingent on this eventuality) to campaign actively for the Manianga candidates for mayorships in Leopoldville so as to integrate the urban Manianga populace with the Council this resolu tion was the most successful two of the mayors chosen the 1965 communal elections were Maniangans) finally it was decided that the new committee would sponsor primary election among the rural Manianga leaders to choose provincial deputy candidates one from each secteur to make up the list that would be handed over to the ABAKO as closed package it was correctly anticipated that in the Lower Congo the voters might be faced with single-party ballot
As will be seen shortly this last resolution was the least successful of all thus paving the way for the third coup within the Manianga Council Not long afterward in January 1965 delegation of urban Maniangans comprised of prominent men such as Kanza and others representing the new Manianga Council central committee made their pilgrimage to the rural homeland to hold the primary election or referendum in concert with the rural mayors and other figures such as teachers pastors and other customary figures Kanza was feted in traditional Kongo style with genuflections and given the total support as first candidate for national senator The rural leaders drew up slate of provincial assembly candidates Unaltered this list would be presented to the Kongo Central provincial pre-election arbitrating board an ad Hoc committee put together by the governor to draw up final ballot In order to understand the mechanics of Lower Congo election eering it is necessary to backtrack to the 1963 ABAKO party congress at Thysville the last time the various dissident elements within ABAKO had met There against rather firm opposition by the governor of the Kongo Central Province who was acting head of the party the congress had resolved to constitute the ABAKO single party ticket for 1964 through rural and urban primaries But in 1964 the rebellions broke out in other parts of the Congo and along with any elections the primaries were also shelved until national salvation plan could be brought into effect Partly due to the haste in which national elections were called by Tshombe and partly due to the recalcitrance of ABAKO to open primaries the formal ABAKO campaign before the people hardly got off the ground Luozi Territory ABAKO for example formally opened its campaign about the time of the Manianga own primary with nothing more than circular letter eventually the territory ABAKO president himself was the only individual originally recruited by ABAKO to appear on the Luozi Manianga ballot In order to meet the formal exigencies of representativeness ABAKO leaders at the provincial level i.e. the governor and his immediate supporters -were forced to recruit their candidates somewhat arbitrar ily and at large Dissatisfaction with this procedure produced an opposition wing within ABAKO which with the backing of CONAKO party secure for the time-being in the national govern ment emerged to present an alternative ballot in some of the territoire elections.1 In the Manianga and few other territoires however the voters were met on election day with the ABAKO old guard single party list and to satisfy those who demanded an open democratic election several inconsequential independent individual tickets The failure of ABAKO to recruit its nominees in primary elections and the adamant campaigning of several regionalist councils similar to the Manianga Council2 necessitated some method of paring down of the many conflicting lists through some process of elimination Thus several weeks before the elections of March 1965 the pre-election arbitrating board of ABAKO and the Lower Congo provincial govern ment met in what came to be known as the Binza Conclave3 essen tially to take final pre-election count of those nominees loyal to the incumbent governor Journalists were barred from the sessions but word soon leaked out that the governor had asked all those wishing to appear on the ABAKO ticket to swear fidelity to his government It is in this process that the Manianga list drawn up in the passion of regionalist solidarity was altered and where the new central committee itself came into bad repute not only with the governor but with its own constituency Kanza refused to bow to the governor and was once more as in 1960 eliminated from any possibility of representing the Manianga on the ABAKO ticket
The remaining Manianga nominees submitted by the Council might not have fared too badly even after this except for slight irregularity of not so slight consequences Acting on the other hand in his role of officer within one of the national ministries he was able without much delay to have these statutes validated and in effect unseat the incumbent Council central committee It must be said in all fairness that this set of statutes was the only one submitted the incumbent committee had not yet gotten around to writing its version although reports are that it fully intended to do so This coup by bureaucratic at then constituted the third succession of central committees in the eight-year history of the Council and to all appearances legitimately so because it was followed by the permissive support of vaguelydefined Manianga constituency
The new statutes generally repeated the earlier ones of 1960 with slightly more radical tone The Manianga Council was again as in 1960 defined as non-profit apolitical association for the benefit of all Maniangans
Where the 1960 version used the term Manianga peuple the 1965 version spoke of the Manianga tribu While in the earlier version full support had been pledged to ABAKO in the new version line of neutrality in this regard was espoused although privately the authors told me that they were both contra-ABAKO and political as they admitted were all other regional councils There is no appropriate clearly-defined closing to this history of the Manianga Council When left the Congo in March 1966 the new committee was preparing to call general assembly Beyond that even they could not predict what would happen Successive events in the Congo have no doubt altered conditions affecting region alist politics but the total lack of documentation of regional politics makes its study most difficult from afar
IV ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
This study has so far sought to describe process and pattern in Congolese micropolity through the optic of one particular regional council
The eight-year history of cleavages coalitions and trans formations within the Manianga Council seen against the backdrop of broader Lower Congo provincial political and economic institutions can be summarized in rather highly impressionistic visual fashion as follows CHART One of the most striking features in this account the recurrence of factional cliques which at intervals have asserted their claim to legitimate leadership in specific context or overall of determinate population Such phenomena are of course not unique to Manianga politics What is identinably unique here and characteristic perhaps of Central and Equatorial African political group formation is that set of historically-conditioned factors allowing for example merchants and civil servants or the secretaries of national ministries and rural peasants to emerge together within single regional identification It is significant furthermore that although in this eight-year history of such regionally-linked micropolity no less than six cliques aspire to influence the renewal of Council leadership or actually to gain control of the Council offices only three cliques or potential central committees are successful in their bid for power Our definition of such successful politics by coup then must remain the seizure of office in such way that it is binding upon and recognized by majority of the regional constituency Each of the thus defined successful coups occurred in the context of specific issue the control of an economic and commercial facility the determination of an electoral list and the right to author and submit the corporate statutes of the Council Discernible beneath each of these issue-provoked factional oppositions were more general although often latent structural categories of internal differentiation within the broader society These internal differentia of the Manianga society as reflected in the oppositions of each coup may be summariz ed Chart
While this type of categorization may gloss over good number of exceptions to the rule it does take note of social differentia that may well have been common in Congolese society at large The first coup of 1961 made explicit certain cleavages created by residence in particular the rural-urban distinction At that time and earlier during the colonial era the Congolese merchant was the one occupa tional group that most easily bridged both categories One Manianga merchant in fact regarded his political role as that of mediator between the two groups idiomatically expressed as the door between the two halves of Manianga society
The second coup of 1964 brought to head the cumulative alienation of the population from entrenched roles of authority reflected at large in Congolese society by the widespread rebellions of that year
And the third coup of 1965 may well have reflected the widerspread distrust of the career politician and the desire for more secure basis of authority evident in the military coup of that year 1st coup 2nd coup townsmen countrymen outs youths ins elders civil servants teachers politicians
CHART
The type of factionalism evident here in the Manianga Council is described by Ralph Nicholas as segmentary factional political system.1 It is characterized by series of crosscutting alignments such that depending on the nature of the particular issue provoking conflict two individuals may be united today but over another issue tomorrow they may be opposed
To apply more exactly to the situation here Nicholas phrase should be amended to read situational segmentary factional politics because it permits and may actually be function of the common participation in council or arena of conflict of many different professions roles and types despite the several mutually-exclusive sets of rules drawn alternately from traditional kinship and modern bureaucracy or age-related codes of conduct and the largely ad hoc principles of political clientage What thus appears in the larger national framework to be various mutually-exclusive and incompatible life commitments such as the proponents of class would emphasize are within the framework Ralph NICHOLAS Segmentary Factional Political Systems in SWARTZ TURNER and TUDEN eds. pp 49-59 of regional politics merely issue-focused factions which although no doubt hindrance to effective concrete economic programs for example actually allow the primordial attachments to home region to remain intact dilemma of sorts is thus created in that the stronger such factional disputes become based on the mutually-exclusive principles of operation such as traditional kinship and bureaucracy within the arena of Council politics the more necessary becomes the psycho logically satisfying reincation of primordial regional identity This dilemma is due in large part to the fact that authority within is usually based on an effective use of connections without such entities as government political parties or other prestige-granting institutions Dependent on outside sources for real support anyone asserting himself within the microsystem of regional politics must on the one hand remain true to the overall goals of the regional group and on the other hand actually achieve concrete results in for example economic development without transferring his own loyalties too far beyond the range of regional peers and thereby losing their support This dilemma of coordinating authority with significant action can perhaps best be seen in the framework of resources and resource allocation regional patrimony comprising both human and material aspects
In article of the second statutes of 1965 the Manianga Council de tines and lays claim to such patrimony in the following words
The association reserves for itself the prerogative of organizing all activity susceptible of achieving cooperation toward the resolution of economic social and cultural problems of the Manianga].
Rephrased this means principally the political power resulting from any organization cooperative endeavor or consensus itself the prereq uisite of concrete e.g. economic action
The dynamics of such patrimony consisting of the interplay of political action and the ongoing redefinition of common material resource may be restated in the form of set of propositions The greater the conceived resource potential the stronger also the incentive toward consensus which is prerequisite to effective action
As an example of this one may cite the sudden acquisition of the rural palm oil processing plant in 1961 and the subsequent move to consolidate cooperative structures with competent urban leadership But the less effective the realization of resource potentials i.e. the greater the frustration of unrealized goals) the more unrealistic or utopian the conceptualization of the overall patrimony As illustrative of this second point one might consider the manner in dispute and reconciliation It is this holistic quality of the political culture believe which compels people like the Maniangans to seek to unite into councils and then to become authoritarian exclusivist and regionally-bound in making consensus forthcoming But it is precisely at this juncture of consolidating alliances without legal support or military backing to speak of that such groups as the Manianga Council experience the greatest likelihood of an internal coup
The ever-recurring major problem with this kind of micropolity that endeavors to serve as both an arena for the expression of conflict and the institution of concrete programs of action is that to the extent to which it serves the former function it becomes ineffectual as stable administrative hierarchy essential in any complex economic program It is for this reason that the participants in the Manianga Council and its affiliated organizations remain preoccupied with the semantics of politics economic pure but ideally the complete absence of politics
The authors of the 1960 Manianga Council statutes were therefore far more astute their apparently paradoxical self-appraisal than they perhaps thought in stating that the Council is an apolitical association to promote political and moral development of the Manianga people.
